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Abstract: Human values seem to vary across time and space. What implications does 
this have for the future of human value? Will our human and (perhaps) post-human 
offspring have very different values from our own? Can we study the future of human 
values in an insightful and systematic way? This article makes three contributions to the 
debate about the future of human values. First, it argues that the systematic study of 
future values is both necessary in and of itself and an important complement to other 
future-oriented inquiries. Second, it sets out a methodology and a set of methods for 
undertaking this study. Third, it gives a practical illustration of what this ‘axiological 
futurism’ might look like by developing a model of the axiological possibility space 
that humans are likely to navigate over the coming decades. 
 
1. Introduction 
Axiological change is a constant feature of human history. When we look back to the 
moral values of our ancestors, we cannot help but notice that they differed from our own. Our 
grandparents, for example, are quite likely to have harboured moral beliefs that would count 
as prejudiced and bigoted by modern standards; and we are quite likely to harbour moral 
beliefs that they would find abhorrent. As we go further back in time, the changes become 
even more pronounced (Pleasants 2018; Appiah 2010; Buchanan 2004; Pinker 2011). 
Axiological variation is also something we see today when we look around the world and 
take note of the different cultures and societies that care about and prioritise different values 
(Flanagan 2017). What consequences does this axiological change and variation have for the 
future? Should we plan for and anticipate axiological change? Can we study the future 
axiological possibilities of human civilisation in a systematic and insightful way? 
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 This article tries to answer these questions in three stages. First, it makes the case for a 
systematic inquiry into the future of human values — termed ’axiological futurism’ — and 
argues that this inquiry is both desirable in its own right and complementary to other 
futurological inquiries. Second, it outlines a methodology for conducting this inquiry into the 
future of human values. And third, it presents a sketch of what this inquiry might look like by 
proposing a tentative model of the ‘axiological possibility space’ that we are likely to 
navigate over the coming decades.  
 
In other words, this article explains why axiological futurism is needed; how we might 
go about doing it; and what it might look like if we did. 
 
2. Making the Case for Axiological Futurism 
Broadly construed, axiological futurism is the inquiry into how human values could 
change in the future. Axiological futurism can be undertaken from a normative or 
descriptive/predictive perspective. We can inquire into how human values should change in 
the future (the normative inquiry) or we can inquire into how human values will (or are likely 
to) change in the future (the descriptive/predictive inquiry).  
 
Axiological futurism is both desirable in and of itself, and complementary to other 
futurological inquiries. As noted in the introduction, we know that the values people 
subscribe to have changed across time and space. This means they are likely to change again 
in the future. This is true even if you think that there is a timeless and unchanging set of 
values (i.e. an eternal and universal set of moral truths) that is not susceptible to change. Why 
so? Because even if you accept this you would still have to acknowledge that people have 
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changed in both their awareness of and attitude towards those timeless and unchanging values 
over time. Perhaps this is because we are getting closer (or further away) from the eternal 
moral truth. Either way, our values are always changing and if we want to understand the 
future we have to factor this change into our accounts.  
 
To illustrate, consider some examples of historical axiological change. One clearcut 
example is the changing attitude toward the moral status of different groups of people. For a 
very long time, most societies adopted the view that some adult human beings (e.g. slaves 
and women) were morally inferior to others (adult, property-owning men). This view may 
always have been contested to some extent (Pleasants 2018, 571; Aristotle Politics 1253b20-
23), but it was the received moral wisdom for the majority and was reflected in their daily 
beliefs and practices. This changed over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, and 
although the old moral attitudes linger in certain contexts and places, the shift has been quite 
dramatic (Appiah 2010). Something similar is true for attitudes toward practices like 
gruesome torture and wanton animal cruelty (Pinker 2011).  
 
There are other clearcut examples of moral variation if we look across cultures. Owen 
Flanagan points this out by comparing Buddhist moral communities and Western liberal 
moral communities (Flanagan 2017). In doing so, he highlights how members of those 
respective communities have very different attitudes towards the value of the individual self 
and the emotion of righteous anger. Buddhist communities usually deny or downplay the 
value of both; Western liberal communities embrace them. 
 
Given the facts of value change, it is prudent to anticipate and plan for future changes. 
The current moral paradigm is unlikely to remain constant over the long term and it would be 
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nice if we know how it is likely to change. This is true even if we approach axiological 
futurism from a normative perspective as opposed to a purely descriptive one. Normatively 
speaking, there is no guarantee that our current moral paradigm is the correct one and so we 
might like to see where future moral progress lies and try to get ahead of the curve (Williams 
2015). Indeed, this kind future-oriented moral reasoning already features in some normative 
decision-making. For example, in certain constitutional law cases in the US — which 
oftentimes engage abstract moral values like justice, fairness and equality (Leiter 2015) — 
judges have reasoned their way to particular conclusions out of a desire to be on the ‘right 
side of history’ (McClain 2018). Conversely, even if you are convinced that the current moral 
paradigm is the correct one, you should still care about the ways in which it might change in 
the future, if only because you want to protect against those changes.  
 
Axiological futurism is also complementary to most other futurological inquiries. Most 
futuristic studies are value driven, even if only implicitly. People want to know what the 
future holds because they value certain things and they want to know how those things will 
fare over time. If we had no value-attachments, we probably wouldn’t care so much about the 
future (if nothing matters then it doesn’t matter in the future either). Value attachments are 
common in the debates about existential risks (Bostrom 2013; Torres 2017). Take, for 
example, the inquiry into climate change. Much of the debate is driven by an attachment to a 
certain set of values. Some people worry about climate change because it threatens the 
capitalistic conveniences and consumer lifestyles they currently value. Others are more 
concerned about central or basic values, such as the value of ongoing human life, and worry 
that this is a put at risk by climate change. Something similar is true in the case of AI-risk. 
People who worry about the impact of superintelligent AI on human civilisation are deeply 
concerned about the preservation of human flourishing. They worry athat the space of 
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possible artificial minds is vast, and that the sub-set of those minds that will be ‘friendly’ to 
human flourishing is quite narrow (Armstrong 2014; Bostrom 2014; Yudkowsky 2011). 
 
These risk-oriented futurological inquiries are either implicitly or explicitly value 
driven: they are motivated by an attachment to certain human values and by the worry that 
socio-technical changes will threaten those values. It is interesting then that these 
futurological inquiries often assume a relatively fixed or static conception of what the future 
of human values might be (indeed oftentimes a quite anthropocentric and culturally specific 
set of values). In other words, they assume that there will be great technological change in the 
future, but not necessarily great value change. Or, even if they do anticipate some value 
change, it is relatively minimal or narrow in nature. There is, consequently, a danger that 
these inquiries suffer from an impoverished axiological imagination: they don’t see the full 
range of possibly valuable futures. There are some exceptions to this (notably Bostrom 2005;  
and, in part, Baum et al 2019) but even those exceptions would benefit from a more thorough 
and systematic inquiry into the space of possibly valuable futures (Van De Poel 2018). Such 
an inquiry might encourage greater optimism about the future — by showing that the space of 
valuable futures is not quite so narrow or fragile as some suppose — or alternatively 
encourage realistic pessimism by showing how narrow and fragile it is. 
 
One could object to axiological futurism on the grounds that it is impossible to say 
anything meaningful or predictive about the axiological future. Any attempt to do so will be 
hopelessly speculative and will more than likely get things wrong. This is, of course, a 
criticism that could be thrown at all futurological inquiries. Futurists are notorious for getting 
the future wrong and looking somewhat foolish as a result. This doesn’t mean the criticism is 
unwarranted, it just means that it is not unique to axiological futurism. The best response to 
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this criticism is to argue that the point of axiological futurism is not to precisely predict the 
future of value. The point of axiological futurism is to map out the broad space of possible 
axiological trajectories that we could take in the future; to anticipate and imagine the different 
scenarios; and to help us to plan for those possibilities. The goal is not to give a precise 
axiological forecast; it is to engage in axiological scenario planning (cf. Baum et al 2019 who 
do something similar from a non-axiological perspective). I hope to show, rather than tell, 
how this might be done in the next two sections of this article, drawing lessons from past 
moral revolutions for guidance (Pleasants 2018; Appiah 2010). 
 
One could also object to axiological futurism on the grounds that it is, in some sense, 
conceptually impossible. We are all trapped inside a particular moral paradigm.1 These 
paradigms shape how we perceive and understand moral value. We cannot get outside these 
paradigms and imagine other axiological possibilities. The obvious response to this is that we 
cannot know whether this is true until we have tried. Furthermore, this criticism is more of a 
concern for the normative version of axiological futurism than the descriptive version. It may 
be true that our moral perceptions and emotions are so tied to a particular paradigm that we 
cannot feel any moral attachment to a different one, but we can at least try to describe and 
understand what it might be like to inhabit a different paradigm (Pleasants 2018). Historians 
and anthropologists do this all the time — they become tourists to different worldviews, both 
historical and cross-cultural. As Thomas Kuhn once argued, a contemporary scientific 
historian might not believe in geocentrism or the existence of phlogistan, but they can at least 
try to figure out what it might have been like to believe in those theories during the relevant 
historical era (Kuhn 1962). The axiological futurist can do the same: they can become tourists 
to new axiological paradigms. It may even be possible for axiological futurists to genuinely 
                                                            
1 As MM pointed out to me, this could also be a problem with any moral philosophical inquiry that tries to get 
outside a current moral paradigm. Consequently, since moral inquiry takes place all the time, we might have a 
reduction of the critique. 
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feel a moral attachment to new paradigms by taking their attachment to current values to their 
logical extremes, e.g. by imagining what it might be like to care about all sentient life 
equally, or to care for robots in the same way that they care for human beings.  
 
One could also take issue with axiological futurism on the grounds that it is nothing 
new. People have been doing it for decades, albeit without the fancy title. For example, 
people who argue that we are transitioning into a ‘post-privacy’, ‘transparent’ society as a 
result of technological change are doing axiological futurism (Brin 1998; Peppet 2015). 
Similarly, someone like Yuval Noah Harari, in his ‘future history’ books, is doing axiological 
futurism when he imagines a future ‘religion’ of ‘dataism’ in which data is valued above all 
else and individualism and humanism are forgotten (Harari 2016). More recently, Ibo Van De 
Poel (2018) has even called for the design of technologies to be sensitive to the possibility of 
value change. I do not deny this nor claim that the project envisaged in this article is wholly 
original. Of course, people have been imagining the future of value for quite some time. What 
is distinctive about axiological futurism is that it calls for a systematic and explicit 
examination of the future of value. Rather than focusing on one specific way in which 
technology might change our values, or on one pet theory of future value, it proposes a 
fullscale, systematic exploration of future axiological possibility spaces. 
 
Finally, one could object to axiological futurism on the grounds that it will be self-
fulfilling or self-defeating. This might be a particular problem if axiological futurism is 
pursued from a normative perspective. Imagined future axiologies can be enticing or 
intimidating. For example, those who like the idea of a post-privacy society can use the idea 
to argue for changes to current social and legal norms; those who hate it can lobby against 
any such changes. The result is that the imagined axiology either comes into being because 
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people want it to or never gets off the ground because people don’t.  But this is, of course, a 
problem for all futurological inquiries. Since human activity is one of the things that will 
determine what kind of future we have, there is always the danger that an imagined future 
compels action in a particular direction (Popper 1957). This seems unavoidable to some 
extent and yet still not a reason to avoid inquiry into the future. Indeed, one potential benefit 
of axiological futurism is that it could encourage a less knee-jerk and emotional response to 
the future. By expanding our axiological horizons we might see less reason to jump to 
conclusions about how desirable or undesirable the future might be. 
 
3. The Methodology of Axiological Futurism 
How could we actually go about doing axiological futurism? What’s the methodology? 
In this section I will sketch an answer to that question. I emphasise, at the outset, that this is 
just a sketch — something that that other people can refine and improve upon.  
 
It helps if we start with a more precise definition of axiological futurism. I defined it 
informally in the preceding section. A more formal definition is now required: 
 
Axiological Futurism: The systematic and explicit inquiry into the axiological 
possibility space for future human (and post-human) civilisations, with a specific focus 
on how civilisation might shift or change location within that axiological possibility 
space. 
 
We’ll unpack the elements of this definition as we go along. From a methodological 
perspective two crucial things emerge from it (a) that axiological futurists must provide some 
theory of the ‘axiological possibility space’ and (b) that axiological futurists must identify the 
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methods that can be used to explore that possibility space and the potential trajectories within 
it. 
 
(a) What is axiological possibility space? 
Let’s start with the theoretical aspect of the methodology: the idea of axiological 
possibility space. Our goal, as axiological futurists, is to explore this space, to figure out the 
ways in which it might vary and change in the future, and to identify some possible 
trajectories that human civilisation might take through this possibility space. To fully 
understand this idea we need to get into some of the basics of moral theory and axiology. 
This will help us to determine what the boundaries of the possibility space might be. 
 
Moral theories are usually made up of two main elements: (i) a theory of what is 
good/bad (i.e. an axiology) and (ii) a theory of what is right/wrong (i.e. a deontology). Moral 
theories are then usually directed at two kinds of entities (iii) moral patients/subjects (i.e. 
those who can be benefitted/harmed by what is good/bad) and (iv) moral agents (i.e. those 
who can perform actions that are right/wrong). Many times these different elements coincide 
in a single moral theory. For example, most adult human beings are viewed as moral patients 
and moral agents and hence are deemed eligible subjects for  both an axiology (i.e. there are 
things that are good for them) and a deontology (i.e. there are rules about what they ought to 
do). Nevertheless, sometimes the elements can pull apart. For example, most young children 
are thought to count as moral patients, but not moral agents. They can be benefitted and 
harmed, but they cannot perform morally right or wrong actions. It may also be possible, 
under certain moral theories, for things to be good or bad simpliciter (in and of themselves) 
without them being good or bad for some moral subject. Certain theories of environmental 
ethics, for example, claim that features of the natural world are intrinsically valuable without 
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being valuable for someone. That said, for the most part, an axiology goes hand in hand with 
a theory about who has moral patiency and a deontology goes hand in hand with a theory 
about who counts as a moral agent. 
 
If our goal was to explore the entirety of moral possibility space, then we would have to 
concern ourselves with all four of these elements (axiology; deontology; patients; and 
agents). But I am suggesting that we concern ourselves primarily with the axiological 
elements. Why is this? Because I make an assumption — which could be challenged — that 
axiology ultimately drives and determines deontology. In other words, I maintain that you 
need to know what is good/bad (and who can be harmed/benefitted) before you can figure out 
what to do about it. If you know that animals can be harmed and benefitted, then you know 
that our actions toward them have a moral dimension. But if you don’t know that, or if you 
don’t accept that, you won’t think of your actions toward them having a moral dimension, at 
least not directly (they may have a moral dimension because of their consequences for other 
moral patients such as your fellow humans or yourself). Your axiological beliefs about 
animals ultimately shape your deontological beliefs. This doesn’t mean they shape them in a 
straightforward or simple way, but they do constrain how you can think about the morality of 
the actions you perform towards animals. This is why I think we should focus primarily on 
axiology. In doing this, we may well generate some conclusions or hypotheses about future 
deontologies — it would be surprising if we did not given the relationship between axiology 
and deontology — but this is not the primary object of inquiry. 
 
An ‘axiology’ will consist of three main things (i) some list or specification of what is 
good/bad; (ii) some identification or specification of who counts as an object of moral 
concern (i.e. who the moral patients are) and (iii) some specification of the relationships 
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between the various elements within the axiology (what’s most important/least important? 
what is intrinsically valuable and what is instrumentally valuable?). Axiological possibility 
space, then, is the full set of possible axiologies, i.e. all the different possible combinations of 
goods, subjects and relationships between them. Presumably, axiological possibility space is 
vast — much larger than anyone can really imagine. But equally presumably, many of the 
‘possible’ axiologies within this space are not that plausible or interesting: e.g. a world in 
which the subjective pleasure we experience while scratching our knees is the only 
recognised good may be possible (in some thin sense of the word ‘possible’) but is not very 
plausible and should not concern us greatly.  
 
Still, the vastness of axiological possibility space poses a challenge for the axiological 
futurist. We need some constraints on the boundaries of axiological possibility space to make 
the project feasible. Fortunately, we can constrain the axiological possibility space to some 
degree by taking advantage of the work that has already been done in defining axiologies, and 
by considering some of the ongoing debates within axiological theory. Doing so, we can 
quickly gain some sense of the kinds of things that could be included in any possible list of 
goods/bads. They would include (as ‘goods’) things like: subjective pleasure, desire 
satisfaction, knowledge, friendship, beauty, education, health, money, family, food and so on. 
We also know the kinds of entities that could count as moral subjects. They would include: 
humans, cognitively complex mammals, all ‘persons’ (human, animal or artificial), all 
sentient beings, all living entities, and possibly some non-living entities of great beauty or 
ecological significance. Finally, we also know the different possible relationships that could 
exist between these goods/bads and the moral subjects: all could be treated equally, there 
could be a clear hierarchy of goods and moral subjects, there could be a cyclical or rotating 
ranking of goods and moral subjects, some goods could be valued intrinsically and some 
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instrumentally, or there could be multiple different combinations of these relationships. So 
we know, roughly, the broad constraints on axiological possibility space. It is still vast, and it 
will be a challenge to explore it, but this what makes axiological futurism an important and 
intellectually fascinating endeavour.  
 
Of course, it is not enough to identify the boundaries of axiological possibility space. 
We also have to think about how changes can come about within that possibility space. This 
is key to the ‘futuristic’ aspect of axiological futurism. Axiological futurism is not conceived 
as a purely abstract, intellectual exercise in which we map out all the plausible, possible 
axiologies that could be taken on by human (and post-human) civilisations. We also want to 
know something about the mechanics of axiological change. How do changes come about? 
Are some changes inevitable or irreversible? How are things likely to change in the future, 
particularly in response to technological change? This doesn’t require falling into the trap of 
precise prediction; but it does mean thinking carefully and systematically about how 
axiologies can vary over time and space. 
 
This might seem like a daunting task, but we know that the mechanics of axiological 
change are relatively simple. There are three things that can happen to change an axiology: (i) 
there can be some expansion or contraction of the circle of moral concern (i.e. the set of 
beings who count as moral subjects); (ii) there can be some addition to or subtraction from 
the set of goods/bads; and (iii) there can be some change in how we prioritise or rank 
goods/bads and/or moral subjects (cf Van De Poel 2018). We see clear evidence for all three 
kinds of change in human history. The end of slavery and the enfranchisement of women can 
be interpreted as either an expansion of the circle of moral concern or a change in how we 
rank moral subjects (towards greater equality). Contrariwise, the rise of fascism and 
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nationalism can be interpreted as a contraction of the moral circle or a demotion in the moral 
ranking of certain subjects. Likewise, the loosening grip of religion over the moral lives of 
industrial society has often brought with it changes to the list of goods/bads (e.g. premarital 
sex or uncontracepted sex is now no longer seen as ‘bad’). Examples could be multiplied.  
 
There is considerable debate in moral philosophy as to whether the changes we see over 
history are, broadly, progressive, or whether certain kinds of axiological change can be 
reliably identified as ‘progressive’ (Moody-Adams 1999; Stokes 2017). One apparent lesson 
from history is that expansions in the circle of moral concern are usually considered 
progressive, and viewed positively in the light of history, but there is no guarantee that this 
trend will continue. For example, some people emphatically reject the idea that expanding the 
circle of moral concern to include artificial entities would be progressive (Bryson 2018), 
while others are more open to the idea (Gunkel 2018). There is no need to enter into these 
debates if axiological futurism is pursued from a descriptive/prescriptive stance since the goal 
is not to get axiological changes right but rather to understand how and why they happen. 
There may, however, be a need to get into these debates if axiological futurism is pursued 
from a normative perspective. In that case, we want to be able say whether or not the 
direction of axiological change is positive or negative. 
 
This is to talk about what must happen to change an axiology. What actually drives 
those changes? Ultimately, all moral change is cashed out at the individual and institutional 
levels: people change in their axiological beliefs, practices and attitudes; and institutions 
espouse and promote those changes. But how do individuals and institutions change? Broadly 
speaking, there are two main drivers of change: intellectual drivers and material drivers. 
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These correspond to the drivers of change that are widely discussed in other sociological and 
ideological debates (e.g. Marxism vs Hegelianism).  
 
Intellectual drivers of change arise from the application of fresh ideas, theories and 
reasons to an axiology. Sometimes they arise from within an axiology. Applied moral 
philosophy is of this kind. Applied ethicists spend much of their time identifying problem 
cases in moral theory and explaining why moral beliefs, attitudes and practices must change 
in response to these cases (Campbell 2014). But there are also non-moral intellectual drivers 
of change. For example, non-moral and non-rational methods of persuasion or example-
setting are sometimes key to moral reform (Moody-Adams 1999; Pleasants 2018; Appiah 
2010). People change because an attractive person espouses or exemplifies change; or 
because they are made to fear staying the same; or for some other non-moral reason (cf 
Fernandez-Armesto 2018 on the influence of ideas on values over time). 
 
Material drivers of change are, obviously, different. They are changes in the material 
conditions of existence which bubble up into changes in axiological beliefs and practices. 
New technologies, for example, often make new actions possible (Currier 2015). They can 
change how we prioritise and rank goods/bads and moral subjects. For example, it is probably 
no accident that slavery was legally abolished after the industrial revolution got going: 
advances in mechanisation obviated some of the need for slave labour that became important 
after the shift to agriculture. Ian Morris has developed an extensive historical theory of why 
this happened, focusing in particular on how changes in technologies of energy capture 
changed values (Morris 2015). On a smaller scale, the technology ethicist Shannon Vallor has 
argued that certain technologies bring with them their own set of ‘values-in-use’, which can 
have a dramatic impact on our overall axiology (Vallor 2016). For example, she argues that 
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advances in the global reach of technology, particularly communications technology, means 
that our circle of moral concern must now be global and not local (Vallor 2016, chapter 2).  
In the next section I will outline another approach to understanding how technology might 
drive axiological change. Nevertheless, we should be sceptical as to whether axiological 
change is ever completely intellectual or material. It is more likely that there is a complex 
feedback loop between both drivers of change. Intellectual factors might drive the creation of 
new technologies, which in turn affect how we behave and what we perceive as valuable; or 
changes in technology might inspire our imaginations to consider new axiological 
possibilities. We do not need to be doctrinaire materialists or idealists to be axiological 
futurists. We can be a bit of both. 
 
In sum, the methodological goal of axiological futurism is to inquire into the 
axiological possibility space for future human and post-human civilisations. The job of the 
axiological futurist is to sketch different possible axiologies, and anticipate the future 
trajectories we might take through the axiological possibility space. 
Elements of an Axiology Axiological Change Drivers of Change 
(i) Set of values (goods/bads), i.e. 
what do people care about and 
promote 
 
(ii) Moral subjects, i.e. who or 
what is worthy of moral 
consideration 
 
(iii) Relations between values and 
subjects, i.e. who or what is most 
important? Do the things and 
subjects that are valued matter 
intrinsically or instrumentally? 
 
(i) Adding to or subtracting from 
the list of values 
 
(ii) Expansion or contraction of 
the circle of moral concern (i.e. 
the set of moral 
patients/subjects) 
 
(iii) Reprioritisations of re-
rankings of the values and 
subjects 
(i) Intellectual drivers of change, 
i.e. changes to how people think 
about their axiologies 
 
Inconsistencies and 
contradictions within the 
axiology 
 
Rational reasoning, teasing out 
the implications or consequences 
of axiological belief 
 
Non-moral, non-rational 
persuasion 
 
(ii) Material drivers of change, 
i.e. changes to the material 
circumstances of life 
 
Axiologies that are internal to 
particular technologies (e.g. 
Shannon Vallor Technology and 
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the Virtues) 
 
Axiologies that are driven by or 
necessitated by external 
technological change (e.g. Ian 
Morris Foragers, Farmers and 
Fossil Fuels) 
 
  
 
Table 1 – Understanding Axiological Possibility Space 
 
(b) What methods can we employ to explore the axiological space? 
Now that we have a clearer sense of the task of axiological futurism, we can consider 
the methods that might assist in performing this task. The methods are going to be a grab-bag. 
Axiological futurism is an inherently speculative and imaginative exercise. We cannot 
experimentally control, manage and predict the future. Karl Popper’s classic arguments 
against predictive social science apply well to axiological futurism (Popper 1957): human 
history is, ultimately, a single unique event, you cannot easily account for the human factor in 
the evolution of societies (particularly since humans discover, react and respond to 
predictions made about their futures), and while you may be able to eliminate some possible 
futures from consideration you can never really narrow it down to one, predictable, future 
trajectory for human civilisation. Consequently, axiological futurism cannot be a ‘science’ in 
the strict sense. It is an exercise in informed speculation. Anything that helps to inform that 
speculation is a viable method of doing axiological futurism.  
 
What follows are some suggested methods of inquiry. Many of these methods are 
already being employed by researchers in philosophy, psychology and social sciences. They 
are just not being employed specifically in the service of axiological futurism. What I suggest 
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here is that they can be repurposed and reconceived for that end. This is a tentative list. The 
hope is that it be will added to in the future.2 
 
Logical Space Methods: The first task of the axiological futurist is to map out the 
contours of axiological possibility space. One obvious way to do this is to map out the logical 
space of variation for a given value or set of values. The resulting logical space will help us 
to identify the different ways in which a value might be specified and how it might relate to 
other values. This is something that is already done by moral philosophers with respect to 
individual values and pairs of values (e.g. Roemer 1998; List and Valentini 2016). For 
example, a lot of work has been done on the logical contours of values such as ‘equality’ and 
‘freedom’. Philosophers have identified dimensions or parameters along which different 
conceptions of these values can vary. A theory of equality for example might vary along two 
dimensions: equality of opportunity and equality of outcome. Given these two parameters, a 
researcher can construct a simple 2 x 2 logical space for the value of equality, classifying 
different possible axiologies depending on whether they score high or low on those two 
dimensions. More complex variations are also possible. 
 
Constructing logical spaces is usually just a matter of carefully reading the theoretical 
literature and spotting the patterns and variations among the different theories associated with 
different values. Christian List and Laura Valentini (2016) adopt this approach when trying to 
understand the value of political freedom. They note that theories of political freedom tend to 
be concerned with interferences with individual behaviour, but then vary depending on the 
kinds of interferences with which they are concerned. Some theories are concerned only with 
actual interferences with individual behaviour (‘freedom as non-interference’ theories); some 
                                                            
2 For a complementary list of methods, focused specifically on AI futurism, see Shahar 2019 
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theories are concerned with possible interferences with individual behaviour (‘freedom as 
non-domination’ theories). Similarly, some theories are only concerned with immoral 
(unjustified) interferences, whereas some theories are concerned with all possible 
interferences, be they moral or immoral. This suggests to List and Valentini that theories of 
freedom vary along modal and moral dimensions and they then use this to construct a 2 x 2 
logical space of freedom.  
 
Both of these examples involve logical spaces for individual values. It is also possible 
to use this method to construct logical spaces to represent the different ways of valuing moral 
subjects and, crucially, for mapping the possible relationships between different values. For 
example, you could imagine a simple axiology in which there are three main values: equality, 
freedom and well-being. Each of these values represents a dimension of variance for a 
possible society. We can then define a three-dimensional axiological space within which 
possible societies can be classified and organised. Some societies may value all three highly 
and try to maximise all three; some will value well-being over freedom and freedom over 
equality (and so on). It may also be the case that certain axiologies that seem to be possible 
within this space are not in fact possible. For example, it may not be possible to maximise 
freedom and equality (or equality and well-being) at the same time. Some tradeoffs and 
compromises may be (logically/physically/technologically) necessary (e.g. Kleinberg, J., 
Mullainathan, S. and Raghavan, M. 2016 on the impossibility of reconciling different 
conceptions of fairness). Historical, cross-cultural and psychological inquiries could be an 
important guide in this respect as they will give us a sense of what has been and is currently 
possible for human societies when it comes to different combinations of values. For example, 
moral foundations theory, which is a psychological theory suggesting that there are five 
(maybe six) basic dimensions of value in human moral psychology, might set an important 
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limit on what is possible when it comes to human axiology (Graham et al 2013; Haidt 2012; 
Flanagan 2017). Whatever the case may be, thinking about the relationships between values 
in terms of logical spaces allows for a more systematic and thoughtful inquiry into 
axiological possibility space.  
 
There are, however, limits to what individual humans can do when it comes to 
constructing and exploring logical spaces. Humans can handle two to three dimensions of 
variance with relative ease. Beyond that, it gets much trickier to intuitively conceive of a 
logical space of possibility. Formal and computer-assisted methods of mapping logical spaces 
may consequently be necessary to make the vast space of axiological possibility more 
tractable and manageable. 
 
Causal Relationship Methods: Mapping the logical space is a first step. Ultimately, 
what we want to know are the causal relationships between potential drivers of change in 
axiology and actual changes in axiology. Figuring out those causal relationships is crucial if 
we are to make the space of possible future axiologies comprehensible. Working out these 
causal relationships will be tricky. Again, we cannot run civilisation-wide experiments on 
possible future axiologies, particularly if axiologies are partly determined by forms of 
knowledge and technology that are yet to be discovered and invented. To make headway on 
this, we have to rely on historical studies of axiological change, cross-cultural studies of 
axiological variance and psychological and small-scale experimental studies of change and 
variance. Each kind of study gives us a different insight into the possible causal relationships 
at play. 
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Historical studies, particularly if they are grand in scope and scale, are helpful because 
they give us a sense of how axiologies have changed in response to (and in conjunction with) 
other social and technological changes. William Lecky’s The History of European Morals 
(1959) is a classic example of this style of inquiry, being one of the first studies to consider 
how material factors drove changes in European axiologies. But intellectual studies of 
axiological change should not be neglected. They show how evolving conceptions and 
ideologies can drive changes in axiological belief systems. JB Schneewind’s study on The 
Invention of Autonomy (1998) is a good example of this style of inquiry. It provides a detailed 
map of the intellectual debates that gave rise to the modern liberal axiology, with its focus on 
the autonomous individual as the ultimate locus of value. Similarly, Kwame Anthony 
Appiah’s study of three historical moral revolutions makes the case for thinking that 
changing conceptions of honor played a key role in moral change (Appiah 2010). Deeper 
historical studies are useful too. Michael Tomasello’s examination of the ‘natural history’ of 
morality, for example, gives a sense of the evolutionary steps that had to be taken for human 
moral systems to arise (Tomasello 2016). Likewise, Ian Morris’s aforementioned study of 
how changes in the technology of energy capture drove changes in axiologies of violence, 
equality and fairness gives a sense of the major socio-technical forces that might be at play in 
axiological change (Morris 2015). This is just a small sample of the historical inquiries that 
can assist axiological futurism. Examples could be multiplied and all are somewhat useful in 
helping us to tease out the potential causal mechanisms behind axiological change and 
thereby extrapolate from the past to the future. 
 
Cross-cultural studies of axiological variance are helpful because they give us a chance 
to learn from ‘natural experiments’ in axiological possibility space. Different axiological 
communities arise in different geographical locations, and in different socio-technical 
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contexts. Comparing and contrasting the axiological variance across communities can give us 
a sense of both (a) the causal factors that might be responsible for this variance and (b) how 
broad the axiological possibility space really is (and thereby help us to overcome the 
parochialism and short-sightedness that often comes with being locked in one axiological 
worldview). Owen Flanagan’s book The Geography of Morals (2017) is a good manifesto for 
this kind of inquiry, demonstrating how anthropological and psychological research can 
support this cross cultural analysis, and providing some detailed normative evaluations of the 
axiological variations between Western and Buddhist societies. There are, of course, many 
other ethnographic and anthropological studies that can assist in studying axiological 
variance. Cross-cultural comparison can be particularly fruitful from a futuristic point of view 
if some communities are further along in their socio-technical development than others. As 
William Gibson once famously observed, the future is already here, it is just unevenly 
distributed. Axiological futurists can take advantage of that uneven distribution to further 
their aims. Indeed, there are some examples of this kind of inquiry already taking place. For 
example, Jennifer Robertson’s Robo Sapiens Japanicus (2017) gives insights into the 
axiological beliefs and practices of Japanese society with respect to robots. This is interesting 
because Japan is a society in which robots are generally more accepted and more widely used 
than in most Western societies. Similarly, Virginia Eubanks’s Automating Inequality (2017) 
takes explicit inspiration from Gibson and argues that poorer communities are subject to 
much greater algorithmic surveillance and governance than wealthier communities, and so 
give us some insight into how axiological beliefs and practices might change if and when 
algorithmic governance technologies become more widely distributed.  
 
Finally, psychological and other experimental studies are helpful because they can 
provide insight into the causal mechanisms that might underlie larger scale axiological 
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change. Studies in moral psychology on the foundations of moral belief and practice (Graham 
et al 2013; Haidt 2012; Greene 2013) and the mechanisms of moral change are obviously of 
great relevance. They help the axiological futurist identify possible upper limits on the 
manipulability of axiological systems in response to intellectual and material drivers of 
change. Studies that focus in particular on how moral beliefs and practices might change in 
response to new technologies are also of particular relevance to the axiological futurist. The 
‘Moral Machine’ experiment, run by researchers based in MIT could be an example of the 
genre, although not conceived by its authors in these terms. This experiment was a largescale 
examination of how axiological (and deontological) belief systems might respond to 
autonomous driving technology (Awad et al 2018), specifically how people would reason 
about dilemmas involving sacrificing different groups of people. The experiment helped to 
reveal different biases in the ranking of moral subjects across different cultures and in doing 
so gives us some sense of the contours of axiological possibility space with respect to one 
particular use of technology.  
As with the mapping of axiological possibility space, some assistance from formal 
computer-assisted modelling could be a useful complement to these experimental approaches. 
For example, computer models of repeated games (like the Stag Hunt or the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma) can give some insight into the causal factors that might be responsible for 
changing social norms over time (Alexander 2008; Bicchieri 2016; Skyrms 1997).  
 
There will always be limits to the informativeness of these experimental approaches. 
They will usually involve small groups of experimental subjects or simplified model 
environments. Most studies will only model a handful of axiological changes and causal 
factors. Even the MIT Moral Machine experiment — which was impressive for the fact that it 
had millions of experimental participants — was limited insofar as it only focused on one 
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type of technological change and one set of moral beliefs (specifically moral responses to so-
called ‘trolley dilemmas’). Limitations of this sort are inevitable and they necessitate caution 
when it comes to extrapolating from these experiments to society-wide axiological changes. 
Still, this shouldn’t negate the great importance of these studies to the axiological futurist. 
 
Collective Intelligence Methods: There is one final class of methods that is worth 
discussing. As we have seen so far, axiological futurism is an exercise in informed 
speculation in which the theorist tries to (a) map the contours of axiological possibility space, 
(b) determine the causal relationships between drivers of change and resulting changes of 
location within that axiological space, and (c) use this to speculate about the possible future 
trajectories that human and post-human civilisations will take through axiological possibility 
space. The axiological futurist draws upon different disciplines and methods to assist in these 
three tasks, including anthropology, history, psychology and moral philosophy. 
 
As noted earlier, there are already some people conducting inquiries that could be 
classed as a type of ‘axiological futurism’. What is notable, to date, is that most of these 
inquiries are the product of individual authors who do not conceive of their projects in the 
terms outlined in this article. This kind of solo-authored inquiry has advantages — it’s 
relatively easy to do and if pursued to the hilt, and sketched in full imaginative depth, it can 
be quite visceral and effective (e.g. Hanson 2016). I mentioned some academic examples 
earlier on but it is true in the case of fiction too. For example, many science fiction novels 
and stories have a strong axiological futurist aspect to them. They often depict dystopian 
futures in which humanity has taken a wrong turn in axiological possibility space. They warn 
us against doing the same. Good examples of this would include George Orwell’s 1984 and 
Dave Eggers The Circle both of which sketch out possible futures in which there is near 
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perfect government and corporate surveillance. Both novels give a sense of what the resultant 
social axiologies might be (a fixation on transparency and conformity), and neither paints a 
flattering picture. Utopian science fiction can do the same thing, albeit with the opposite 
purpose in mind. 
 
The problem with solo-authored work of this sort is that it is often narrow-minded and 
biased. Individual authors have their own axes to grind. They focus on one or two 
technological or social changes and consider one or two consequences for our axiologies. 
They don’t think about multiple changes in parallel nor the possibility of multiple different 
future axiologies. For example, they might focus solely on changes to surveillance 
technology, and imagine what might happen if that technology gets really good, while at the 
same time ignoring similar changes to other technologies such as genetic engineering, 
cyborgification, robotics, space exploration and so on. Better work will try to consider 
multiple streams of change, but individuals are always limited in what they can do.  
 
One way of overcoming these individual limitations is to use methods that allow groups 
of people to collaborate effectively on the axiological futurist project. We can call such 
methods ‘collective intelligence’ methods (Mulgan 2017; Malone 2018; Hogan, Johnston and 
Broome 2015; Hogan, Hall and Harney 2017). It may seem a little odd to single these out as a 
distinctive subset of methods. After all, the hope is not that groups will pursue different 
methods but, rather, pursue the methods outlined above more efficiently and effectively. It 
may also seem a little redundant: surely all research projects are ultimately pursued by 
groups, even if only indirectly? No person is an island unto themselves: even quintessential 
lone geniuses like Einstein and Darwin had collaborators to help with their projects.  
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This is all true, but it is worth addressing collective intelligence methods separately for 
three main reasons. First, the idea of ‘collective intelligence’ features centrally in the 
proposed map of the future axiological possibility space that is outlined below in section 3. 
Foreshadowing it here will make it easier to understand what is discussed there. Second, as 
should be clear, axiological futurism necessarily draws upon multiple disciplines. If we had 
some formal method for usefully collecting and harnessing multiple insights from these 
respective disciplines we could greatly enhance the scope and depth of axiological futurism. 
Third, people have already begun to argue that we should think about collective intelligence 
methods as their own distinct method (Malone 2018, Mulgan 2017, Hogan, Hall and Harney 
2017). It is not enough to simply get a group of people with diverse backgrounds and 
different areas of expertise together in a room and hope that they will produce insights that 
are greater than the sum of their parts. Good group work is hard to do (Straus, Parker and 
Bruce 2009). Groups often fail to produce better insights than individuals. They often 
develop their own biases and collective group think; particular individuals can dominate 
discussions and deliberations, thereby substituting their own agenda for that of the group; 
people can also get ‘blocked’ or be overly timid in groups, resulting in them producing fewer, 
not more, insights than they might achieve on their own steam. So although group work has 
the potential to overcome the limitations of individualism, it can only do this if it is done in a 
systematic and thoughtful way.  
 
Fortunately, people have already started to do this and have developed formal methods 
for enabling groups to work together effectively. I confess to having a vested interest in this 
idea. In previous work, along with my colleagues, I used formal collective intelligence 
methods to get an interdisciplinary group to think about how technological transformation 
might change the future of social governance, and to consider the research questions that 
 26 
need to be answered as a result of this (omitted). We did this by organising group work into 
three main phases of activity: (i) an idea generation phase, in which we encouraged 
individuals within the group to generate as many different ideas as possible in response to a 
particular research question; (ii) a deliberation and discussion phase, in which members of the 
group added to and critically evaluated one another’s ideas and (iii) a 
convergence/consolidation phase, in which we got the group to coordinate on producing a 
particular output (in our case a draft agenda of research questions keyed to relevant methods 
for answering those question). Breaking group work down into these phases might sound like 
common sense but it is striking how infrequently it is done. Furthermore, when done 
explicitly and thoughtfully it is possible to plan specific group work activities — such as 
idea-writing and structured dialogues — that make the maximum use of each phase. Doing 
this helped our group to produce an output that would have been impossible if we had worked 
on our own. There is reason to hope that similar collective intelligence methods could be a 
boon to the axiological futurist project.  
 
(c) Interim Conclusion 
This concludes the discussion of how we might go about doing axiological futurism. I 
have summarised the key ideas from this section in the table below. 
Logical Space  
Methods 
Causal Relationship 
Methods 
Collective Intelligence 
Methods 
Pitfalls/Things to 
Avoid 
Methods dedicated to 
working out the contours 
of axiological possibility 
space. 
 
Establish dimensions 
of variance for 
particular values and 
map the resulting 
logical space. 
 
Establish dimensions 
of variance for 
multiple values and 
Methods dedicated to 
working out the causal 
drivers of change 
(intellectual and 
material) within 
axiological possibility 
space 
 
Use historical 
studies that focus on 
value change over 
time 
 
Develop cross-
Methods dedicated to 
getting interdisciplinary 
groups to collaborate 
effectively on mapping 
the possibility space 
and working out the 
causal drivers of change 
 
Identify and assemble 
group members 
 
Adopt ‘divergent 
thinking’ methods to 
enable the group to 
Narrow-framing, i.e. 
focusing on only one 
technological driver of 
change or one value/set 
of values 
 
Cultural and individual 
bias, i.e. being too 
wedded to one set of 
values (particularly 
problematic for 
descriptive axiological 
futurism) 
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map their relations to 
one another 
 
Use cross-cultural 
and historical 
analysis to figure out 
the variation in 
particular values 
 
Use psychological 
studies on moral 
psychology (e.g. 
moral foundations 
theory) to determine 
upper limits on the 
flexibility of moral 
standards. 
cultural studies of 
natural experiments 
in value change 
 
Use psychological 
and other 
experimental studies 
to examine 
relationships 
between causal 
variables and value 
change 
 
Use computer 
modelling/game 
theoretical studies of 
shifting value 
equilibria 
generate diverse 
insights or thoughts 
(e.g. responding to a 
trigger statement) 
 
Adopt processing and 
collaborative methods 
to enable the group to 
comment on and 
develop one another’s 
ideas (e.g. idea-writing, 
group 
deliberation/dialogue) 
 
Adopt a ‘convergent 
thinking’ method to get 
the group to coordinate 
on a shared output. 
Group think (when 
collaborating with 
others) 
 
Mono-disciplinarity 
 
Table 2 – Methods for Exploring Axiological Possibility Space 
 
4. The Three Intelligences: A Model of the Axiological Possibility Space 
Now that we see why axiological futurism is valuable and how we might go about 
doing it, let’s turn to what it might look like if we did. In this section, I present a map of (a 
portion of) the axiological possibility space that humans are likely to navigate in the coming 
decades. Included within this map will be a model of the causal relationships between 
technological change and axiological change. The implicit claim made by this model is that if 
we promote and encourage certain technological changes, then we will also promote and 
encourage certain axiological changes, and vice versa (assuming there is a feedback loop 
between the intellectual and material drivers of change). The map and the model are the result 
of my own informed speculation, with all the caveats that entails.   
 
The model is inspired by Ian Morris’s aforementioned theory of value change (Morris 
2015). Accoding to this theory changes in the technology of energy capture affect societal 
value systems. In foraging societies, the technology of energy capture is extremely basic: 
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foragers rely on human muscle and brain power to extract energy from an environment that is 
largely beyond their control. Humans form small bands that move about from place to place. 
Some people within these bands (usually women) specialise in foraging and others (usually 
men) specialise in hunting. As a result foraging societies tend to be quite egalitarian. They 
have a limited and precarious capacity to extract food and other resources from their 
environments and so they have to share when the going is good. They are also tolerant of 
using some violence to solve social disputes and to compete with rival groups for territory 
and resources. They display some gender inequality in social roles, but they tend to be less 
restrictive of female sexuality than farming societies. Consequently, they can be said to value 
inter-group loyalty, (relative) social equality, and bravery in combat. These are the 
foundations of their value systems. Farming societies are quite different. They capture 
significantly more energy than foraging societies by controlling their environments, by 
intervening in the evolutionary development of plants and animals, and by fencing off land 
and dividing it up into estates that can be handed down over the generations. Prior to 
mechanisation, farming societies relied heavily on manual labour (often slavery) to be 
effective. This led to the moralisation and justification of social stratification and wealth 
inequality, but less overall violence. Farming societies couldn’t survive if people constantly 
used violence to settle disputes. There was a focus on orderly dispute resolution, though the 
institutions of governance could be quite violent. There was much greater gender inequality 
in farming societies because (a) women were required to take on specific roles in the home, 
and (b) the desire to transfer property through family lines placed a special value on female 
sexual purity. This affected their foundational values around gender and wealth equality. 
Finally, fossil fuel societies capture enormous amounts of energy through the combustion and 
exploitation of fossil fuels (and later electricity, nuclear power, and renewable energy 
sources). This enabled greater social complexity, urbanisation, mechanisation, electrification 
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and digitisation. It became possible to sustain very large populations in relatively small 
spaces, and to facilitate more specialisation and mobility in society. As a result, fossil fuel 
societies tend to be more egalitarian than farming societies, particularly when it comes to 
political and gender equality, though less so when it comes to wealth inequality. They also 
tend to be very intolerant of violence, particularly within a defined group/state. 
 
The model I develop here takes two key ideas from Morris’s theory. The first is the 
notion of an ‘ideal type’ of social order. Human society is complex. We frequently use 
simplifying labels to make sense of it all. We assign people to general identity groups (Irish, 
English, Catholic, Muslim, Black, White etc) even though we know that the experiences of 
any two individuals plucked from those identity groups are likely to differ. We also classify 
societies under general labels (Capitalist, Democratic, Monarchical, Socialist etc) even 
though we know that they have their individual quirks and variations. Max Weber argued that 
we need to make use of such ‘ideal types’ in social theory in order to bring order to the 
complexity (Weber 1949), while beiing fully cognisant of the fact that the ideal types do not 
necessarily correspond to social reality. Morris makes use of ideal types in his analysis of the 
differences between foraging, farming and fossil fuel societies. He knows that there is no 
actual historical society that corresponds to his model of a foraging society. But that’s not the 
point of the model. The point is to abstract from the value systems we observe in actual 
foraging societies and use them to construct a hypothetical, idealised model of a foraging 
society’s value system. It’s like a Platonic form — a smoothed out, non-material ‘idea’ of 
something we observe in the real world — but without the Platonic assumption that the form 
is more real than what we find in the world.  
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This brings me to the second idea. The key motivation for the model I will now develop 
is that one of the main determinants of our foundational values is not the technology of 
energy capture that we rely upon but, rather, the form of intelligence that is prioritised and 
mobilised in society. I here define ‘intelligence’ as the capacity to solve problems across 
different environments (Malone 2018; Mulgan 2017). Intelligence is a basic resource and 
capacity of human beings and human civilisations (Tainter 1988; Turchin 2007; Henrich 
2015). It’s what we rely upon for our survival and it’s what makes other forms of 
technological change possible. For example, the technology of energy capture that features in 
Morris’s model is, I would argue, itself dependent on intelligence.  
 
I submit that there are three basic forms that intelligence can take: (i) individual, i.e. the 
problem-solving capacity of individual human beings, (ii) collective, i.e. the problem-solving 
capacity of groups of humans working and coordinating together, and (iii) artificial, i.e. the 
problem-solving capacity of machines. For each kind of intelligence there is a corresponding 
ideal type of axiology, i.e. a system of values that protects, encourages and reinforces that 
particular mode of intelligence. Since these are ideal types, not actual realities, it makes most 
sense to think about the axiologies we see in the real world as the product of tradeoffs or 
compromises between these different modes of intelligence. Much of human history has 
clearly involved a tradeoff between individual and collective intelligence. It’s only more 
recently that ‘artificial’ forms of intelligence have been added to the mix. What was once a 
tug-of-war between the individual and the collective has now become a three-way ‘contest’ 
between the individual, the collective and the artificial. My contention is that the axiological 
possibility space that we navigate over the coming decades will be defined by these three 
ideal types of axiology associated with individual, collective and artificial intelligence. 
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That’s the model in a nutshell. It might seem a little abstract and opaque at this point. 
Let’s clarify by translating it into a picture. In Figure 1, I’ve drawn a triangle. Each vertex of 
the triangle is occupied by one of the ideal types of society: (i) the society that prioritises 
individual intelligence, (ii) the society that prioritises collective intelligence, and (iii) the 
society that prioritises artificial intelligence. The claim being made is that societies can be 
classified according to their location within this triangle. For example, a society located 
midway along the line joining the individual intelligence society to the collective intelligence 
society would prioritise technologies that enhance both individual and collective forms of 
intelligence, and would have an axiology that mixed the values associated with both. A 
society located at the midpoint of the triangle as a whole, would include elements of all three 
of the ideal types. And so on. 
 
 
 Figure 1 – The Intelligence Model of Axiological Space 
Individual Intelligence
Collective Intelligence
Tech base - enhancement; 
augmentation

Values - responsibility; 
agency; self-determination; 
moral equality
Artificial Intelligence
Tech base - network; 
communications

Values - solidarity; cohesion; 
common ownership; common 
good
Tech base - AI, robotics

Values - leisure, recreation, 
idleness; abundance; post-
scarcity….?
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The value of this picture depends on what we understand by its contents. What follows 
is a brief sketch of each ideal type: 
 
Individual Intelligence Society: Individual intelligence is the intelligence associated 
with individual human beings, i.e. their capacity to use mental models and tools to solve 
problems and achieve goals in the world around them. In its idealised form, individual 
intelligence is distinct from collective and artificial intelligence. In other words, the idealised 
form of individual intelligence is self-reliant and self-determining. It is promoted by any and 
all technologies that promote individual problem-solving capacity and self-reliance. This 
includes most ‘tools’ and could also include technologies of individual enhancement (e.g. 
cognitive enhancers, cyborgification, and genetic engineering). The associated ideal type of 
axiology will consequently place an emphasis on intelligent individuals as the most important 
moral subjects and will try to protect their interests, identify their responsibilities, and reward 
them for their intelligence. It will ensure that the individual is protected from interference 
(i.e. that they are free and autonomous); that he/she can benefit from the fruits of their labour; 
that their capacities are developed to their full potential; and that they are responsible for their 
own fate. In essence, it will be a strongly liberal axiological order. 
 
Collective Intelligence Society: Collective intelligence is the intelligence associated 
with groups of human beings, and arises from their ability to coordinate and cooperate in 
order to solve problems and achieve goals. Examples might include a group of hunters 
coordinating an attack on a deer or bison, or a group of scientists working in lab trying to 
develop a medicinal drug. Collective intelligence thrives on technologies that enable group 
communication and coordination, e.g. networking and information communication 
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technologies. The idealised form of collective intelligence sees the individual as just a cog in 
a collective mind. The associated ideal type of axiology is one that emphasises the group as 
the most important moral subject, and values things like group cohesion, collective welfare, 
common ownership, and possibly equality of power and wealth (though equality is, arguably, 
more of an individualistic value, and so cohesion might be the overriding value). In essence, 
it will be a strongly communistic/socialistic and possibly nationalistic axiological order. 
 
I pause here to repeat the message from earlier: these are ideal types of axiological 
order. There never was a primordial liberal state of nature in which individual intelligence 
flourished. On the contrary, it is more likely that humans have always been social creatures 
and that the celebration of individual intelligence came much later on in human development 
(Schneewind 1998; Siedentop 2012). Nevertheless, I also suspect that there has always been a 
compromise and back-and-forth between the two poles. 
 
Artificial Intelligence Society: Artificial intelligence is the kind of intelligence 
associated with computer-programmed machines. It is inherently technological. It mixes and 
copies elements from individual and collective intelligence (since humans created it and their 
data often fuels it), but it is also based on some of its own tricks. It functions in forms and at 
speeds that are distinct from human intelligence. It is used initially as a tool (or set of tools) 
for human benefit: a way of lightening or sharing our cognitive burden. It can, however, 
function autonomously and without human input. It is even possible that, one day, AIs will 
pursue goals and purposes that are not conducive to our well-being (Bostrom 2014). The 
idealised form of AI is one that is independent from human intelligence, i.e. does not depend 
on human intelligence to assist in its problem solving abilities. The associated ideal type of 
axiology is, consequently, one in which human intelligence is devalued; in which machines 
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do all the important cognitive work; and in which we are treated as (at best) moral patients 
(beneficiaries of their successes). Think about the future of automated leisure and idleness 
that is depicted in a movie like Wall:E or, perhaps, in Ian M Banks’s Culture novels. Instead 
of focusing on individual self-reliance and group cohesion, the artificially intelligent axiology 
will be one that prioritises human pleasure, recreation, game-playing, idleness, and machine-
mediated abundance (of material resources and phenomenological experiences) (reference 
omitted). 
 
The sketch of this last ideal type of axiology is, admittedly, deeply anthropocentric: it 
assumes that humans will still be the primary moral subjects and beneficiaries of the 
artificially intelligent social order. You could challenge this and argue that a truly artificially 
intelligent order would be one in which machines are treated as the primary moral subjects 
(Gunkel 2018). That’s a possibility that should be entertained. For now, I stick with the idea 
of humans being the primary moral subjects because I think that is more technically and 
politically feasible, at least in the short to medium term. I also think that this idea gels well 
with the model I’ve developed. It paints an interesting picture of the arc of human history: 
Human society once thrived on a combination of individual and collective intelligence. Using 
this combination of intelligences we built a modern, industrially complex society. Eventually 
the combination of these intelligences allowed us to create a technology that rendered our 
intelligence obsolescent and managed our social order on our behalf. This adds a new 
element to the axiological possibility space that we will navigate over the coming decades 
(figure 1). 
 
There are problems with this model. It’s overly simplistic; it assumes that there is only 
one determinant of fundamental values; and it seems to ignore or overlook moral issues that 
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currently animate our political and social lives (e.g. identity politics). Still, by focusing on the 
abstract property of intelligence as the major driver of axiological change, the model provides 
a starting point from which a more complex sketch of the axiological possibility space can be 
developed. I want to close by suggesting some ways in which this model could be (and, if it 
has any merit, should be) developed: 
 
• Other potential dimensions of variance and/or ideal types of social order should be 
offered and evaluated.  
• A more detailed sketch of the foundational values associated with the different ideal 
types should be provided. 
• The links between the identified foundational values and different social governance 
systems should be mapped in more detail.  
• An understanding of how other technological developments might fit into this 
‘triangular’ model is needed.  
• A normative defence of the different extremes, as well as the importance of balancing 
between the extremes, is needed so that we have some sense of what is at stake as we 
navigate through the possibility space. This would be essential if we are to pursue 
axiological futurism from a normative stance.  
 
In short, we need to make full use of the methods outlined in the previous section in 
order to explore the possibility space as best we can. In this respect, (somewhat ironically) 
collective intelligence methods could be particularly valuable. Perhaps there could be a series 
of mock ‘constitutional conventions’ for the future, in which such groups actually draft and 
debate the different possible ideal type axiologies? 
 
 36 
5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, axiological futurism is the systematic and explicit inquiry into the 
axiological possibility space for future human (and post-human) civilisations. Axiological 
futurism is necessary because, given the history of axiological change and variation, it is very 
unlikely that our current axiological systems will remain static and unchanging in the future. 
Axiological futurism is also important because it is complementary to other futurological 
inquiries. While it might initially seem that axiological futurism cannot be a systematic 
inquiry, this is not the case. Axiological futurism is an exercise in informed speculation. The 
job of the axiological futurist is to map the axiological possibility space and consider how 
civilisations might shift and change location within that possibility space in the future. The 
goal is not precise prediction but, rather, scenario planning. In doing this, the axiological 
futurist can call upon a number of disciplines for assistance, including philosophy, history, 
anthropology, and psychology. I have tried to show how this might be done by presenting a 
model of the future axiological possibility space that focuses on the role of intelligence in 
shaping our foundational values. I hope that others join the cause and develop axiological 
futurism into a distinctive branch of research. 
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